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PARTNERSHIP TAXATION: THE ALLOCATION OF
SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INCOME AND LOSS
UNDER THE 1954 CODE
by Michael M. Boone
The partnership agreement plays the most important role in the
determination of each partner's tax liability for the income and loss
of the business. Consequently, the draftsman of the agreement must
consider the desires of the partners in relation to the federal tax laws.
With respect to the determination of each partner's distributive share,
the 1954 Code permits the partners to agree to special allocations of
specific items of income and loss in certain instances. This privilege
affords the partners a vital and flexible means of tax planning. The
scope and purpose of this Comment is to analyze those particular sec-
tions of the partnership tax laws which deal with the allocation of
specific items of income and loss.1
I.
General Partnership Taxation2 A partnership as such is not tax-
able, but each partner is taxed individually on his share of the part-
nership income or loss.' The partnership acts merely as an account-
ing entity by filing a required informational return.' Each partner
must, in turn, account for his distributive share of the partnership
income and loss items in his own personal return whether actually
distributed to him or not.' The code requires each partner to state
'This Comment will basically limit itself to a discussion of §§ 704(b), 704(c), and
707(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. For further references in this area, see gen-
erally: Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partnerships-Special Allocation of Specific Items, 1958
U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 421; Gelband, Allocations of Income and Deductions Among Part-
ners, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX 997 (1963); Jackson, The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183 (1954); McDonald, Distributive Share of
Partnership Income and Losses, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 41 (1957); WILLIs, HAND-
BOOK OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 55 7.01-.09, 11.05-.07, and 12.01-14 (1957); Willis &
Bauman, Recent and Prospective Developments in Taxation of Partnerships, 16 VAND. L.
REv. 291 (1963).
'For a general discussion of partnership taxation, see 6 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 5 35.01 (1957).
8INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 701. The definitions of a partnership and a partner are
set forth in 55 761 and 7701(a)(2) and the related regulations.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6031. Treas. Reg. 5 1.6031-1 (1959) contains the proper
requirements for filing the partnership return.
5INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 702. Section 182 of the 1939 Code explicitly stated that
the partner must account for his distributive share "whether or not distribution is made."
Although 5 702(a) of the 1954 Code makes no mention of this requirement, no change in
the law was intended. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1954). The courts have
upheld this point of view. Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1953); Nash
separately his respective share of certain specific items of income,
gain, loss, deduction, and credit.' These specific items fall into seven
enumerated classes: short-term capital gain, long-term capital gain,
gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property used in trade or
business, charitable contributions, dividends, taxes paid or accrued to
foreign countries or possessions of the United States, and partially
tax-exempt interest on obligations of the United States. In addition
to these seven items, the code authorizes the Treasury, at its own
discretion, to require the segregation of any item of income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit which is not otherwise treated separately.!
This catch-all provision means that any item, the character of which
would alter any partner's personal tax liability, must be treated sep-
arately.' The purpose of segregating these specific items in the return
is to treat them as if each partner's share of such item had come di-
rectly to the partner in the same transaction and in the same manner
as it came to the partnership.' In other words, the character of each
segregated item is carried over into the hands of the individual part-
ner in order to reflect correctly income for tax purposes. For ex-
ample, if the partnership recognizes a long-term capital gain from
the sale of an asset, the partner's share of this item will likewise be
treated as a long-term capital gain. This conduit rule, however, is
limited to those enumerated items mentioned in the code and the
regulations." The remaining taxable income and loss items of a
partnership fall into a general class and have no particular character-
Miami Motors, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1388 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.
1966).
'TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 702(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (1956).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702(a)(8). In implementing this discretionary power,
the Service has enumerated in Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (i) (1956) specific items of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, and credit that must be accounted for separately in reporting a
partner's distributive share. Among the items are the following: recoveries of bad debts, prior
taxes, and delinquency amounts (§ 111); gains and losses from wagering transactions (§
165(d)); medical expenses (5 213); intangible drilling and development expenses (§
263(c)); exploration expenditures (5 615); and any item which is subject to a special al-
location under the partnership agreement. See, as an illustration of purpose, S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 376-78 (1954).
8Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (ii) (1956). In addition to those specific items that the
Service has listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (i) (1956), the partners must likewise ac-
count separately for any partnership item which if separately taken into account by any part-
ner would result in an income tax liability for that partner different from that which would
result if that partner did not take the item into account separately. For example, where a
partner would qualify for the retirement income credit under § 37 of the code if the part-
nership pension and annuities, interest, rents, dividends, and earned income were separately
stated, such item must be accounted for separately by each partner.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 702(b).
l' But see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 702(a) (8). See note 7 supra and accompanying
text.
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ization upon distribution to the partners." These nonsegregated items
are generally treated as ordinary profit and loss of the partnership.
II.
The Partner's Distributive Share-General Allocation Rule The
code provides that a partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss,
deductions or credit shall be determined in accordance with the
partnership agreement.' The importance of a thoughtfully drawn
agreement is readily apparent. The partners are free, within certain
limits, to control and determine their individual tax liability for the
partnership profit and loss. It should be noted that the code provides
that any change and modification in the partnership agreement will
be effective for tax purposes if made prior to the required time for
filing the partnership return in the taxable year." This rule allows the
partnership a flexible means of changing the division of income and
loss in order to meet substantive and economic changes in the organ-
ization and its members. As might be expected, however, limitations
have been placed upon this privilege so that the income of the part-
nership may not be shifted arbitrarily between the partners from year
to year for the purpose of obtaining the best tax result."
The average partnership agreement contains a general profit and
loss ratio" by which the partners may agree to share ordinary income
and loss in any manner that they desire. Furthermore, the partner-
ship agreement may provide a different ratio for sharing income than
tSINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702(a)(9). Section 703 (a) of the 1954 Code provides
for the computation of the partnership taxable income. The section states that the taxable
income of the partnership, although not taxable as such, shall be computed in the same man-
ner as the taxable income of an individual with certain exceptions. Among the exceptions
is the requirement that the segregated items as described in § 702 (a) (1)-(8) must be stated
separately, i.e., such items are not considered in the computation of the partnership taxable
income. Likewise, the section prohibits the use of personal deductions in determining the
partnership taxable income.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(a).
'3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 761 (c). Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (c) (1956) indicates that
the Service will recognize all partnership agreements and modifications whether oral or writ-
ten. Nevertheless, sound partnership planning requires that all internal agreements be in writ-
ing in order to safeguard against any dispute between the partners or legal question that
might arise later.
'"Commissioner v. Estate of Goldberger, 213 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1954).
"If the partnership agreement is silent as to the manner for sharing ordinary profit and
loss, the manner in which the net profit or loss is actually credited on the partnership books
will control in determining the general profit and loss ratio. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1)
(1956). It should also be noted that Treas. Reg. S 1.761-1 (c) (1956) provides that "As to
any matter on which the partnership agreement, or any modification thereof, is silent, the
provision of local law shall be considered to constitute a part of the agreement."
"Hellman v. United States, 44 F.2d 83, 90 (Ct. Cl. 1930). This proposition is based
on the assumption that any agreement as to the sharing of ordinary profit and loss is made
at arm's length.
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that applicable for sharing losses." On the other hand, the majority
of partnership agreements do not expressly provide for a division of
specific items of income and loss such as dividends, capital gains and
losses, and tax-exempt interest. The code states that if the partner-
ship agreement is silent as to the allocation of any item of income or
loss, the partners will share such item in the same ratio as ordinary
income and loss is divided.'" This general allocation rule follows the
entity theory of partnerships, i.e., the partners, like stockholders in a
corporation, are treated as if they do not have separate rights in sep-
arate items of income and loss. The 1954 Code, however, permits the
partners to avail themselves of the aggregate theory of partnerships,
i.e., the partners are treated as co-owners who have individual rights
in each item of income and loss. If the partnership agreement so pro-
vides, the partners may share a specific item of income or loss in a
ratio different from the general profit and loss ratio. The present tax
laws permit such allocations in three general areas: (1) section 704 (b)
allows the partnership agreement to make a special allocation, differ-
ing from the general ratio of dividing profit and loss, of a particular
item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit; (2) section 704 (c)
allows the special allocation of depreciation, depletion, and gain or loss
from property contributed to the partnership; (3) section 707(c)
allows guaranteed payments to be made to a partner for services
rendered without regard to partnership earnings.
m.
Section 704(b)-Specific Allocation Rule The 1954 Code grants the
partners ample freedom to determine and arrange their tax liability
with respect to separate items of partnership income and loss. Section
704 (b) states in a negative fashion that a specific item of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit may be allocated in a manner
differing from the general profit and loss ratio if the partnership
'
7 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954). See also 1 BARRETT & SEAGO,
PARTNERSHIPS 528 (1956).
1SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(b) (1). Section 704(b) of the 1954 Code provides:
(b) Distributive Share Determined by Income or Loss Ratio - A partner's
distributive share of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall
be determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable income
or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9), for the taxable
year, if -
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's distribu-
tive share of such item, or
(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement
with respect to the partner's distributive share of such item is the avoidance
or evasion of any tax imposed by this subtitle.
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agreement so provides.' " The section also stipulates, however, that a
specific allocation of any item will be disregarded if such allocation is
made principally for the purpose of tax avoidance. 0 If an allocation is
found to violate the tax-avoidance rule, the particular item of income
or loss involved will be distributed in accordance with the ratio for
sharing ordinary profit and loss. It should be recognized that the
disallowance of one special allocation will not affect the validity of
others since each one is made independently.
The problem encountered by the draftsman of the partnership
agreement involves the determination of what is a valid allocation
within the meaning of the tax laws. Realistically, in most situations
the partners will agree to a special allocation only if it results in some
tax benefit. Whether the mere existence of such a purpose is itself a
violation of section 704 (b) (2) cannot be determined from the code
alone since it does not elaborate on the tax-avoidance proviso. How-
ever, it seems clear from legislative history that Congress did not in-
tend for every allocation which produced a tax savings to fall au-
tomatically within the tax-avoidance classification. 1 The Senate
Finance Committee report indicates that a special allocation will be
allowed if it produces a "substantial economic effect" and is not
"merely a device for reducing the taxes of certain partners without
actually affecting their shares of partnership income."'2 The substan-
tial economic effect concept is intended to prevent an allocation
which is made in form only, i.e., an allocation which does not in fact
change the partners' dollar shares of partnership income independ-
ently of the tax consequences. The Service, however, does not treat
the economic effect of an allocation as the only consideration in de-
termining whether such allocation has been made principally for the
purpose of tax avoidance. The regulations state that each allocation
"must be considered in relation to all the surrounding facts and
circumstances."' In addition to the primary consideration of sub-
stantial economic effect, five other factors, discussed below, are set
forth which must be taken into account in determining whether an
allocation is made for the purpose of tax avoidance.' It should be
19Ibid. The 1939 Code did not expressly provide for specific allocations of partnership
items of income and loss. However, the Treasury ruled that under the 1939 Code partners
could allocate items of income and loss in a ratio other than the general profit and loss ratio
of the partnership, provided such allocations were not for the purpose of tax avoidance.
Rev. Rul. 138, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 543, revoking Rev. Rul. 134, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 649.
Note that this ruling came after the passage of the 1954 Code.
20INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(b) (2).2
'See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
2 Ibid.




understood that one factor in itself will not disqualify an allocation
so long as there are other indications of a purpose other than tax
avoidance.
Business Purpose. Lack of a business purpose will not itself dis-
qualify an allocation but its absence will cast considerable doubt as
to the true purpose of the allocation. Numerous non-tax business rea-
sons for agreeing to a special allocation may exist. For example, the
allocation of a disproportionate percentage of foreign income to the
partner in charge of foreign operations as an incentive to manage
such operations more efficiently would appear to be a sound business
reason." The fact that the partners bargained for a special allocation
and would not have formed the partnership without such an alloca-
tion, however, is not considered a sufficient business purpose.
Substantial Economic Effect. As indicated above, an allocation must
"affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total part-
nership income or loss independently of tax consequences.""7 Stated
negatively, a special allocation will not have a substantial economic
effect if the partners receive the same dollar amount of the total part-
nership income and loss that they would have received if no special
allocation had been made. For example, assume that in the AB part-
nership the partners agree to share general profit and loss equally."
The partners also agree to a special allocation by providing in the
agreement that A who is foreign partner is to receive a greater per-
centage of foreign income. As a result of this allocation, partner A
will actually receive more of the total partnership income than if no
special allocation had been made. Since A's and B's shares of the total
partnership income are affected independently of tax consequences,
the allocation has a substantial economic effect.
In applying the economic effect test, a special allocation will be ex-
amined in relation to other allocations and adjustments made by the
partnership. The purpose is to prevent an offset in the economic effect
of an allocation through the juggling of other income and loss items."
For instance, assume that in addition to the special allocation of for-
eign income made to A the partners agree that B is to receive an addi-
tional amount of ordinary income equivalent to A's greater percentage
s See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (2) (1956).
26 See Driscoll, supra note 1, at 429.
2 7Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (1956). See note 21 supra and accompanying text. For
a thorough analysis of the substantial economic effect test as related to the tax avoidance
limitation of § 704(b) (2), see Jackson, note I supra, at 1187-89.26 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (2) (1956).
29 In addition, the Service will look closely at salaries, expenses, and similar items of the
partnership to see if they have been adjusted in order to offset a special allocation.
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of foreign income." It is obvious that the increase in B's share of ordi-
nary income will offset the special allocation of foreign income to A.
The net effect of these two allocations is to give the partners the
same dollar amount of total partnership income as they would have
received in the absence of any special allocation. Such an allocation
has no economic effect and thus would be disregarded for tax pur-
poses unless other circumstances showed that the allocation was not
made principally for the purpose of tax avoidance.
The economic effect factor is also applicable to deductions. How-
ever, the substantial economic effect concept has a somewhat different
connotation when mentioned in regard to the allocation of a deduc-
tion. The validity of a special allocation of a deduction depends pri-
marily on the actual relationship between the item of deduction and
the partner to whom the allocation is made." The allocation of an
item of deduction will have a substantial economic effect if the part-
ner to whom it is allocated has in fact an economic interest in the
deduction, i.e., he has actually borne the expense of the deduction.
In general, an allocation to a partner against whom the deduction has
been charged on the partnership books will in most cases be considered
to have an economic effect. For example, if a charitable contribution
made by the partnership is charged to the capital account of a par-
ticular partner, an allocation of the charitable deduction to the part-
ner charged will be allowed. Likewise, in an oil and gas partnership,
the allocation of intangible drilling and development expenses to the
partner who has in fact financed the drilling of the well would be
valid."'
Related Items. The third factor considers "whether related items of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the same source are sub-
ject to the same allocation.""3 For instance, where a partnership agree-
ment provides for a special allocation of all income from taxable se-
curities to one partner, the Service will consider how the capital gain
or loss from the sale of such securities is to be allocated.
Normal Business Risks. The regulations indicate that an allocation
which is not subject to normal business risks raises an inference of tax
avoidance. This applies, for example, when the partners do not agree
to special allocations of tax-exempt interest and dividends until the
end of the taxable year when the amount of such items are reasonably
certain. The time factor, like the other five, is not conclusive in de-
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2), example (1) (1956).21 See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (5) (1956).
'3 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
[Vol. 20:840
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termining tax avoidance but must be considered in relation to all the
facts. A change in business conditions or in the business operations
might necessitate allocations of specific items at a time when the
amount of such items are readily known. Nevertheless, sound tax
planning suggests that the partners should agree to special allocations
well in advance of the end of the taxable year in order to safeguard
against any questions arising with respect to this fourth factor.
Duration. The consistency with which an allocation is made year
after year will ordinarily suggest a purpose other than tax avoidance.
Apparently, an allocation made for only one year will be viewed with
some suspicion. The duration factor prevents the juggling of different
items of income between the partners from year to year so as to ob-
tain the best tax advantage in each particular year."
Overall Tax Consequences. In addition to the other five factors, the
regulations state that each allocation must be viewed in light of its
coverall tax consequences" to determine if such allocation was made
primarily for tax avoidance purposes. Although this last factor is
regarded as a catch-all clause, it is not intended to close the door to
every allocation which results in a tax benefit. Presumably, the prime
purpose of this factor is to prevent some unusual abuse of the special
allocation privilege that is not reached by the other factors.
In partnership tax planning the facts peculiar to the partnership
and its members will determine whether a special allocation of some
specific income or loss items is needed and warranted. The regulations
set out several examples' which not only illustrate the application
of the six factors discussed above but also demonstrate possible valid
uses of the special allocation privilege. For instance, one example sug-
gests that partners can agree to the special allocation of gain arising
from the sale of property which had appreciated in value prior to
the admission of a partner."6 Partner M contributes $25,000 cash and
enters as an equal partner in the KL partnership, a brokerage, at a
time when certain securities held by the business have a basis of
$20,000 and a fair market value of $50,000. The subsequent sale of
the securities at an appreciated value of $74,000 results in a taxable
gain of $54,000. The partnership agreement provides that $24,000
(appreciation in value occurring after M entered the partnership)
will be allocated equally between K, L, and M. However, with respect
to the remaining $30,000 gain which is attributable to the apprecia-
tion in value prior to the entry of M in the partnership, the agree-
34 See notes 13 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
"See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), examples (1)-(5) (1956).
'
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (4) (1956).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ment provides that such gain is to be allocated to K and L in ac-
cordance with the profit and loss ratio existing at the time of the
admission of M. The regulations state that such an allocation has sub-
stantial economic effect and will be recognized in the absence of
other circumstances showing tax avoidance as its primary purpose.
The reason for such an allocation in this fact situation is to remove
the tax advantages accruing to the old partners if each new partner
were required to share a tax burden arising before their admission.
Of course, the tax planner must consider whether the complexities
of such an allocation override the benefits sought.
The partnership which owns municipal bonds may desire to make
a special allocation of the tax-exempt interest that is earned on these
bonds. In one example in the regulations" the CD partnership agree-
ment provides that C's distributive share of income is to be the first
$10,000 of tax-exempt interest and D's distributive share of income
is to be the first $10,000 of dividend income, the balances of the in-
come to be divided equally. The regulations declare that this alloca-
tion provision will be disregarded since its principal purpose is to al-
locate tax-exempt interest to C who is in a higher income tax bracket
than D. Although the regulations do not specifically mention the
fact, it is obvious that this allocation of tax-exempt interest has no
substantial economic effect since the partners receive the same dollar
amount of total partnership income as if no allocation had been
made." Nevertheless, the fact that the regulations do not speak in
terms of the lack of an economic effect in disallowing this allocation 9
implies that the Service might draw the same conclusion even if the
tax-exempt interest had been allocated to C in a manner affecting the
partners' shares of the total partnership income. Would the Service
still consider such an allocation to be made for the purpose of tax
avoidance if the allocation had not been made to the partner in the
higher tax bracket and it did have a substantial economic effect? In
the absence of some other factor showing tax avoidance, the answer
would appear to be no.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2), example (3) (1956).
3' For illustration, assume the CD partnership received $12,000 of tax-exempt interest and
$14,000 of dividend income. Partner C would receive $13,000 of partnership income ($11,000
of tax-exempt interest plus $2,000 of dividend income). Partner D would likewise receive
$13,000 of partnership income ($12,000 of dividend income plus $1,000 of tax-exempt in-
terest). Thus, the partners receive the same amount of the total partnership income that
each would have received if the dividend income and tax-exempt interest had been shared
equally under the general profit and loss ratio.
" The third example in the regulations states that since the principal purpose of this pro-
vision is to allocate tax-exempt interest to C, who is in a higher income tax bracket than
D, it will be disregarded. No other reason is given for disallowing the allocation. In other
words, no mention is made with respect to the substantial economic effect of the allocation.
[Vol. 20:840
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The regulations also present an illustration of a valid allocation of
tax-exempt interest." Partner A and partner B agree to invest surplus
partnership funds in an equal dollar amount of municipal bonds and
corporate stock in order to avoid a distribution which might affect
the credit standing of the partnership. The partners further agree
that A is to receive all the interest income and capital gain or loss
from the tax-exempt bonds, and B is to receive all dividend income
and gain or loss from the corporate stock. The regulations state that
this provision in the partnership agreement is valid since it has a
substantial economic effect. It is true that this method of allocating
tax-exempt interest and dividend income will change the partners'
shares of total partnership income independent of the tax conse-
quences.4 However, the validity of this allocation seems to rest more
on the fact that the division of the principal amount invested rep-
resents the actual economic interests of the partners. In other words,
this allocation has accomplished the same results as if the AB partner-
ship had distributed the surplus partnership funds to A and B, and
each had invested his share of the funds in tax-exempt securities and
corporate stock respectively. Thus, independent of any change in
the partners' shares of the total partnership income, the implication
is that a special allocation will have a substantial economic effect if it
represents the true economic interests of the partners.
The tax advantages of special allocations are especially significant
to the "service" partnership where one of the partners contributes
the bulk of the capital required, and another partner provides serv-
ices." The financing partner is particularly interested in the alloca-
40 See note 37 supra.
41 This statement is valid only if the partnership does not receive equal amounts of tax-
exempt interest and dividend income. If this were not the case, then the partners would re-
ceive the same amount of the total partnership income as if the tax-exempt interest and divi-
dend income were divided in accordance with the general profit and loss ratio.41See Rev. Rul. 39, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 403, holding under the facts presented in an
application for a ruling that investment of a partner's contributed capital in securities of
his own choice and for his own account is in effect a withdrawal of such capital from the
firm.43 See Rev. Rul. 66-187, 1966 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 12, which supports this view.
A syndicate, a partnership for tax purposes, was formed for the express purpose of acquiring
and distributing a single issue of tax-exempt municipal bonds. In accordance with the syn-
dicate agreement, the tax-exempt interest received by the organization was to be allocated
only to those members who had advanced funds used to purchase the bond issue. Citing the
third example in the regulations, the ruling stated that the allocation of tax-exempt interest
has "substantial economic effect" as intended by the regulations. In other words, the allo-
cation recognized the economic realities of the true ownership of the tax-exempt interest
received by the syndicate.
" The typical service partnership generally involves two types of individuals. On the
one side, the inventor or manager contributes his services and knowledge to the venture. The
service partner generally does not contribute capital, and therefore, his interest (basis) in
the partnership is zero at the beginning. On the other side, the investor (money-man) con-
tributes the necessary capital to get the venture started. The investor is usually allowed to
1966]
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tion of the initial partnership losses since he in fact bears the economic
risks of the business venture. The regulations indicate that the entire
deduction for early partnership losses may be specifically allocated to
the financing partner even though the partnership agreement provides
a different ratio for sharing profits and losses after the business has
been established.4 It should be noted here that section 704(d) pro-
vides that a partner's distributive share of the partnership loss "shall
be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's
interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which
such loss occurred." This limitation should be considered when
drafting the agreement of a service partnership." In the normal sit-
uation, a service partner's distributive share of the losses would go
undeducted in the year in which they were incurred since his ad-
justed basis in the partnership is extremely low."8 To remedy this sit-
uation, the draftsman might limit the service partner's share of the
partnership losses to the extent of the balance in his capital account."
This provision would guarantee that all the losses could be deducted
in the year in which they were sustained by the partnership. The fact
that the service partner will completely lose the right to share in
these initial partnership losses seems justifiable since it is the con-
tributing partner's capital investment which actually sustains the
loss.
Section 704(b) has been of particular importance to the oil and
gas industry with respect to the allocation of intangible drilling and
recoup his initial investment before the service partner can begin sharing in the partnership
income and loss. See generally Tenen, Tax Problems of Service Partnerships, N.Y.U. 16TH
INST. ON FED. TAX 137 (1958).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (5) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6771, 1964-2
CuM. BULL. 177; cf. Cleveland v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1961).
4
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(d).
" See I RABKIN & JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS, form 1,49 (1966). See note 87
infra showing the tax court's denial of a partner's deduction for his distributive share of the
partnership losses.
48 It should be noted that a disallowed loss deduction can be carried over indefinitely.
Therefore, it can be deducted at the end of the first succeeding partnership taxable year,
and subsequent partnership taxable years, to the extent that the partner's adjusted basis for
his partnership interest at the end of any such year exceeds zero (before reduction by such
loss for such year). Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (d) (1) (1956). In the initial years of a service
type partnership, the partner who provides his services normally would have a zero basis in
the partnership. Thus, his share of the initial partnership losses would go undeducted until his
adjusted basis in the partnership exceeded zero in a subsequent year.41 See Willis, The Model Partnership Agreement, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 173,
182-83 (1957). If losses are allocated to the partner who has contributed the capital, then
the partnership agreement must make an adjustment in the partner's distributive shares of
the profits for subsequent years, i.e., the partner to whom the additional losses are charged
must be allocated an additional amount of partnership income in order to offset the losses




development expensesY The formation of a partnership and the spe-
cial allocation of such deduction items to the financing partner pre-
sents a sound solution to the carried interest problem." For example,
partner A, the owner of an oil and gas lease joins with partner B,
an investor, who contributes the money necessary for the drilling of
the well. Partner B is particularly concerned with the deductibility of
the expenditures for intangible drilling and development costs since
he bears the economic risks of the operations." The regulations indi-
cate that the partnership agreement may provide that all intangibles,
all expense deductions, all depletion, and depreciation are to be spe-
cially allocated to B." Likewise, B can be allocated a greater percentage
of the income until he has recovered all of his investment; thereafter,
the partners will share equally in income and expenses. This special
allocation reflects the economic realities of the situation since B has
actually borne the expense of such deductions. This method of allo-
cating intangible drilling and development expenses resolves the un-
certainties encountered in the carried interest method of allocating
such items."
'0 See Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partnerships-Special Allocation of Specific Items, U. So.
CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 421, 440-47; Jackson, Tax Problems of Oil and Gas Partnerships
(Subchapter K), SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 6TH ANNUAL INST. ON OIL AND
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 441 (1955).
" The carried interest problem can briefly be stated as follows: A, the owner of an oil
and gas lease, assigns the lease to B, the investor, who agrees to assume all financial risks of
drilling the well. The agreement between the parties provides that B is entitled to all produc-
tion until he has recouped his investment, at which time half interest in the lease reverts to
A, and they thereafter share equally in expenses and production. This type of transaction was
upset by the case of Commissioner v. Abercrombie, 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947), where
the Fifth Circuit held that the assignor (A) had retained title to a half interest in the lease,
and the assignee (B) was merely lending the assignor his share of the development expense.
Since the court considered the parties to be equal owners of the lease at all times, each was
held to be entitled to deduct one-half of the intangibles and each chargeable with one-half
of the income. Thus, the investor who bore the risk of the venture was denied the right of
deducting all the intangible drilling expenses. The results of the Abercrombie case seriously
affected the oil and gas industry since no investor desired to risk his money when he could
not be assured of deducting all of the intangibles. It should be noted that there now appears
to be a conflict in the courts on the carried interest transaction. The Ninth Circuit refused
to follow the Abercrombie decision in United States v. Thomas, 329 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.
1964). See Horrow, Current Partnership Problems in Oil and Gas Operations, SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, 17TH ANNUAL INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 303
(1966).
"2 Jackson, note 50 supra, at 444 points out that the partnership (joint venture) coupled
with § 704(b) attracts risk capital.53 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), example (5) (1956).
54 See note 51 supra. There has been some controversy as to whether a carried interest
arrangement is actually a joint venture so that it will be treated as a partnership under the
1954 Code. See Comment, Is the Carried Interest a Partnership?, 13 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 51
(1964). Regardless of the controversy, the parties involved in a carried interest situation can
definitely obtain the advantages of § 704(b) by merely formalizing their arrangement into
a joint venture agreement.
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IV.
Section 704(c)-Contributed Propertyss Partners are often con-
fronted with problems arising from the contribution of property to
the business by one of the members as his capital investment. Per-
haps the most common one can be illustrated by the following situ-
ation. At the beginning of the AB partnership, partner A contributes
$1000 worth of cash and partner B contributes nondepreciable prop-
erty with a fair market value of $1000 but with an adjusted basis
of $200. According to the code, the basis of the property in the
hands of B is carried over into the hands of the partnership. Thus, if
the AB partnership later sells the contributed property for $1000,
there will be a taxable gain of $800. Such a gain is not a true eco-
nomic gain to the partnership since it arose because the property had
appreciated in value between the time B acquired it and the time he
contributed it to the partnership. The gain is unreal to A and he will
certainly question the fairness of having to pay taxes on a propor-
tionate share of a gain which resulted from appreciation in value
of partnership property prior to its contribution to the business.
In regard to this problem, the 1954 Code allows the partnership, if
it so elects, to shift precontribution gains among the partners. Sec-
tion 704 (c) establishes the general rule that depreciation, depletion,
or gain or loss with respect to contributed property is to be allocated
among the partners in the same manner as if such property had been
purchased by the partnership."5 As an exception to this general rule, the
same section provides that the partners may by agreement provide
for the special allocation of such items in order "to take account of
the variation between the basis of the property and its fair market
value at the time of the contribution." 7 Thus, the 1954 Code adopts
an entity approach under the general rule, but allows the partners to
allocate such precontribution gain or loss within the concept of the
aggregate approach. For instance, the AB partnership agreement
" Contributed property is defined as property which has actually been contributed by a
partner to the partnership so as to become partnership property as among the partners and
not merely subject to the claims of the partnership creditors. Where a property's use is subject
to the consent of a partner, the property is not contributed property for the purposes of
§ 704(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (c) (1) (1956).
5 INT. REV. ConE OF 1954, § 704(c) (1). See examples set out in Treas. Reg.
1.704-1(c)(1) (1956).
STINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(c) (2). The section reads as follows:
(2) Effect of Partnership Agreement. - If the partnership agreement so
provides, depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to property con-
tributed to the partnership by a partner shall, under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate, be shared among the partners so as to take ac-
count of the variation between the basis of the property to the partnership
and its fair market value at the time of contribution.
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might provide that upon any subsequent sale or exchange of the
property, the gains attributable to precontribution appreciation will
be allocated to contributing partner B.s" Such an allocation would
more correctly reflect the economic realities of the gain as between
the partners. Of course, any gain that had arisen since contribution
would be divided in accordance with general profit and loss ratio.
Therefore, if the property contributed by B had been sold for $1200,
B would recognize a gain of $900 (the $800 precontribution gain
and his $100 share of post-contribution gain) and A would recognize
a gain of $100 (his share of the $200 post-contribution gain).
The partners may also provide for the special allocation of depre-
ciation or depletion with respect to contributed property in order to
account for the difference in the basis of the property and its value
at the date of contribution." Such deductions can be allocated to the
noncontributing partners to approximate the deduction which they
would have obtained if the basis of the contributed property equalled
its value at the time of the contribution. For example, assume that in
the CD partnership, C contributes depreciable property with an ad-
justed basis of $6000 and a fair market value of $10,000." D con-
tributes $10,000 worth of cash. The $4000 difference in C's basis
in the contributed property and its fair market value represents a
potential gain to the partnership. If the basis of the contributed prop-
erty had equalled its value of $10,000, the partnership would have
an annual depreciation deduction of $1000 (assuming annual de-
preciation rate is ten per cent); and therefore, D would have a de-
duction of $500. But with a $6000 basis, the partnership would have
an annual depreciation deduction of only $600. The partners could,
however, amortize the precontribution gain of $4000 over the life of
the asset by making a special allocation of the depreciation to the non-
contributing partner. This is accomplished by allocating $500 to D
and $100 to C of the annual depreciation. The $400 difference would
represent the amortization of the precontribution gain. At the end
of ten years, the contributed property would be fully depreciated. If
the partnership had no other income or loss during this period, D's
basis for his interest would be $5000 ($10,000, original basis of his
interest, reduced by the annual depreciation deductions totaling
$5000). C's interest would likewise have a basis of $5000 (his orig-
inal basis of $6000 minus his share of the depreciation for ten years
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (c) (2) (i) (1956). See RABKIN & JOHNSON, Op. Cit. supra note
47, form 1.18.
"See RABKIN & JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 47, form 1.19.
'
0 Treas. Reg. 5 1.704-1 (c) (2) (i), example (1) (1956).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
totaling $1000). Thus, the special allocation of depreciation to D
offsets the deferred gain attributable to appreciation in value prior to
the contribution of the property by C.
The regulations have adopted the so-called "ceiling" approach in
limiting the amount of precontribution depreciation, depletion, or
gain or loss allocations."' According to this concept, an allocation
"cannot exceed the amount of gain or loss realized by the partnership
or the depreciation or depletion allowable to it.""2 The "ceiling" will
apply in those cases where the contributed property is sold at a price
below its fair market value at the time of its contribution but above
its adjusted basis in the hands of the contributor. In such a case, the
partnership would have an economic loss (value of property to part-
nership minus sales price) and a taxable gain (sales price minus ad-
justed basis of the property to the partnership). However, under the
"ceiling" limitation, only the allocation of the taxable gain realized
by the partnership would be allowed for tax purposes." Likewise, the
partners cannot take deductions for depletion or depreciation which
the partnership did not in fact realize. This limitation prevents the
partners from creating items which are not real to the partnership for
tax purposes.
Section 704 (c) appears to be an adaptation of the special alloca-
tion rule under section 704 (b). The draftsmen of the code apparent-
ly recognized the importance of permitting the partners to arrange
equitably the tax liability for precontribution gain or loss with respect
to contributed property. Unlike section 704 (b), however, the priv-
ilege of allocating depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with re-
spect to contributed property is not subject to any tests of tax
avoidance, business, or economic purposes. All that section 704 (c)
requires is that an election be expressly set out in the partnership
agreement."
e Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (c) (2) (i) (1956).
21 Ibid.
6
aFor example, assume that A contributes property with a fair market value of $1000
and an adjusted basis of $750. The property is sold for $900 resulting in a taxable gain of
$150. If the partnership agreement is silent, A and B will be allocated $75 of the gain in-
dividually. However, if the economic realities of the sale are to be fully realized by the
partnership, a $250 gain (the difference between the fair market value and the basis at the
time of the contribution) should be allocated to B and a $100 loss should be allocated to the
partnership. The net result being that A would realize a $50 loss and B would realize a
net $200 gain ($250 precontribution gain reduced by the $50 share of partnership loss).
However, under the "ceiling" approach, only the actual partnership gain or loss can be
allocated to any partner. Thus, only the $150 gain allocated to B could be realized in this
fact situation.




Section 707 (c) -Guaranteed Payments Prior to the 1954 Code any
payment of compensation to a partner was considered to be a part of
his distributive share of the partnership income.0" Maintaining an ab-
solute aggregate concept of partnerships, the Treasury refused to
allow such payments to be treated as deductible business expenses by
the partnership. The present tax laws, however, recognize that part-
ners may deal with the partnership as independent third persons."'
Section 707 (c) states that "payments to a partner for services or for
the use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a mem-
ber of the partnership. 6 7 Thus, salary payments to partners and in-
terest payments on a partner's capital account are deductible expenses
in determining the partnership taxable income. To qualify for a de-
duction, however, the salary must be in the form of a "guaranteed
payment." Section 707(c) stipulates that such payments must be
determined without regard to the income of the partnership in order
to be classified as guaranteed payments."s The term guaranteed pay-
ment as it is used in the code embraces the idea that such payments
must be definite rather than contingent on the income of the partner-
ship. Obviously, a partner's salary which is based on a certain per-
centage of income would not qualify as a guaranteed payment. Such
a payment would be included in the determination of a partner's dis-
tributive share. Likewise, a partnership agreement whereby one part-
ner is to receive the first $10,000 of partnership income would not
meet the requirements since the partner is not assured of receiving
the $10,000 salary. Another interesting example which illustrates the
guaranteed payment requirement is found in the regulations. " Partner
C in the CD partnership is to receive 30 per cent of the partnership
income, but he is guaranteed at least $10,000 regardless of partner-
ship income. The regulations state that if the partnership income is
"5Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956); Melville W. Thompson, 18
B.T.A. 1192 (1952). For an historical discussion of guaranteed payments, see 6 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.23 (1957). The 1939 Code provided that salaries paid to
partners were not deductible in computing net income of the partnership. Treas. Reg. 118,
539.183-1(b) (1939).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (a) (1956). The regulations state that a partner who engages in
a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as a partner shall be treated as if
he were not a member of the partnership with respect to such transaction.
"0INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 707(c). This section reads as follows: "(c) Guaranteed
Payments. - To the extent determined without regard to the income of the partnership, pay-
ments to a partner for services or use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not
a member of the partnership, but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross
income) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or business expense)."
6' Ibid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c) (1956).
GTreas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c), example (2) (1956). See Rev. Rul. 66-95, 1966 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 17, at 12.
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$60,000, C is entitled to $18,000 as his distributive share and no part
of this amount is to be treated as a guaranteed payment. In other
words, if C's distributive share of the partnership income is the same
or greater than the guaranteed minimum payment, no part of his
distributive share will qualify as a guaranteed payment of salary. On
the other hand, if C's percentage share of the partnership income is
less than the guaranteed minimum, the difference in his minimum
guaranteed and his distributive share of income will be treated as a
guaranteed payment. For example, if the CD partnership has income
of $20,000, $6000 would be C's distributive share, and the remaining
$4000 payable to C would be a guaranteed payment.
Section 707 (c) provides that guaranteed payments of salary and
interest to partners are treated as made to strangers only for the pur-
poses of the recipient partner's gross income and the partnership's
deductible business expenses."0 "For the purposes of other provisions of
the internal revenue laws, guaranteed payments are regarded as a
partner's distributive share of ordinary income."71 Thus, a partner
who received a salary while absent from work due to illness can not
claim a sick pay exclusion under section 105 (d)."7 Likewise, a part-
ner who receives a guaranteed payment is not considered an employee
for the purposes of withholding tax or for the purposes of contribu-
tions to employee pension or profit-sharing plans.7"
Where a partnership operates on the accrual basis and a partner
receiving a salary payment is on the cash basis, the question may arise
as to when the partner must report the guaranteed payment. By
manipulation of payments the partners might obtain a tax advan-
tage if the partnership were allowed to deduct the payment in one
year and the partner were allowed to report the receipt of such pay-
ment in a different taxable year.'4 Consequently, the Service has seen
70 See note 67 supra.
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c) (1956). The tax court in Thomas Browne Foster, 42 T.C. 974
(1964) upheld the validity of this regulation. The court held that this interpretation of the
regulation applied where a nonresident citizen of the United States claimed that certain
amounts he received from his United States partnership were guaranteed payments for work
he performed abroad, and therefore qualified for exclusion as foreign earned income. The tax
court rejected the dictum in Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) that
if the taxpayer had taken his income from the partnership as a salary under § 707 (c), none
of it would have been taxable, since it would have been earned entirely outside the United
States. See Wren, Planning Problems of Partners and Partnerships, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 400
(1963).
"'See Rev. Rul. 56-326, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 100.
" The Service held in Rev. Rul. 675, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 459 that guaranteed payments
of salary are includible for self-employment tax purposes.
"4E.g., If the net income of the AB partnership is $1000 before deducting A's $4000
salary, there will be a partnership loss of $3000. If the partners share profits and losses
equally, A and B will each receive a $1500 loss. In accordance with the regulations, A will
have to report a salary payment of $4000 in the same taxable year that he reports the loss.
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fit to close the loophole. The regulations require that guaranteed pay-
ments be reported by the partner in the same taxable year that the
partnership "deducts such payments as paid or accrued under its
method of accounting.""5 Thus, in some instances, a partner will
have to report his salary in his tax return even though it has not
actually been received.
When earnings of a partnership are insufficient to cover the guaran-
teed payment, an operating loss is created. ' Suppose partner M is to
receive a $10,000 salary and fifty per cent of the taxable partnership
income and loss. The MN partnership, however, has only $2000 in-
come for the year. As a result, the payment of the $10,000 salary to
M produces an $8,000 loss to the partnership. Under present law
partner M will report $10,000 of ordinary income (his guaranteed
payment) and a $4000 loss (his distributive share of the partnership
loss). The net of the two items is $6000 of income from partnership
sources to partner M."
In situations where the partnership has received capital gains or
some other special type of income but does not have enough ordi-
nary income to cover the guaranteed payment, the regulations re-
quire that the special type of income be distributed separately and
that the guaranteed payment be treated as if paid out of ordinary
income. For example, assume partner X in the XY partnership is to
receive a guaranteed salary of $10,000 per year plus fifty per cent of
the partnership taxable income and loss. The partnership receives
$30,000 in capital gains and no other income or deduction except
the $10,000 paid X as a guaranteed payment. In accordance with the
regulations, X would report $10,000 of ordinary income (his guar-
anteed payment), a $5000 loss (his distributive share of the partner-
ship's ordinary loss created by his guaranteed payment), and $15,000
Thus, he would report a net income from the partnership of $2500 ($4000 salary minus
$1500 distributive share of partnership loss). However, in the absence of the regulations, A
would report only a $1500 loss from partnership sources if the partnership was on an
accrual basis and A had not received the guaranteed payment. The difference in tax results
is obvious. See Rev. Rul. 675, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 459.75
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1956); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 706(a). Under
706(a), the inclusion of a guaranteed payment in a partner's gross income is based on the
partnership's income "for any taxable year of the partnership ending within or with the tax-
able year of the partner." E.g., assume the partner who receives a salary payment on
December 31, 1966, is on a calendar year basis and the partnership is on a fiscal year basis
ending May 31st. The partner would report the guaranteed payment on his tax return for
the year 1967, not for the year 1966.
7' The partnership tax planner must not overlook the possible creation of losses by
guaranteed payments and the resulting consequences under § 704(d) of the code. See notes
46-49 supra and accompanying text. See also Holdsworth, Tax Losses and Cash Flow: How
To Treat Partners' Drawings and Salaries When There Are Losses, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 721, 749-65 (1962).
"See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c), example (3) (1956).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in capital gains (his distributive share). The guaranteed payment
must be paid out of the ordinary income of the partnership for tax
purposes.8 It has been suggested that where it is known in advance
that a partnership will receive substantial amounts of special income
(e.g., capital gains), th epartners may prefer to designate less as
guaranteed payments and more as distributive share in order to share
the resultant tax incidence more equally. 9
The reporting of a guaranteed payment as an item of gross in-
come by the recipient partner may present an interesting problem
when the computation of the partner's gross income is important for
the purposes of some other provision of the code. ' For instance, sec-
tion 6501(e) extends the statute of limitation for assessment and
collection from three years to six years if the taxpayer fails to report
in his gross an amount which is in excess of twenty-five per cent of
the amount of gross income stated in his return.8 Section 702 (c)
provides that where it is necessary to determine the gross income of a
partner for tax purposes such amount shall include his distributive
share of the partnership's gross income. 2 Since the partnership's gross
income must be computed without deducting guaranteed payments as
an expense, there will be an obvious overlap in reporting the guaran-
teed payment in the partner's gross income. First, the guaranteed
payment will be included in the partner's gross income as salary under
707(c), and secondly, part of the guaranteed payment will be in-
cluded in the partner's gross income as his distributive share of the
partnership gross income under 702 (c). This double exposure of a
guaranteed payment might in some instances exaggerate a partner's
gross income to the extent that the understatement or exclusion of
non-partnership items of gross income will not exceed twenty-five
per cent as required for section 6501 (e) to take effect.3 An amend-
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (c), example (4) (1956).
79 See Crampton, Partner-Partnership Transaction, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 71
(1957).
8 For a general discussion of this problem, see WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, § 11.05
(1957).
I TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(e). Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(c) lists several instances
where it is necessary for a partner to include his distributive share of partnership gross income
in the computation of his personal gross income.
1
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702(c). It should be recognized that a partner's distribu-
tive share of the partnership gross income must be substituted for the amount reported in
his return as his distributive share of partnership income and loss in order to obtain the true
amount of gross income stated in his return.
SaFor illustration, assume that partner A fails to report on his tax return $2000 of
dividend income from sources unrelated to the partnership business. The Service requires him
to calculate his gross income for the purposes of § 6501(e). The partnership has a gross
income of $10,000 before deducting a salary payment of $6000 to A. In determining the
stated gross income in his return, A will include $6000 as a salary payment under § 707(c)
and $5000 as his distributive share of the partnership gross income under § 702(c). The
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ment to section 702 (c) has been proposed in order to remedy this
situation." Nevertheless, at the present time, the code does not con-
tain an answer to the problem. Therefore, it appears that until there
is legislative action, the courts will have the burden of finding an
equitable and yet justifiable solution when the problem arises.
Section 707(c) of the 1954 Code is the statutory implementation
of the view that a partner may deal with the partnership as an un-
related third person. This view removes the unrealistic treatment
that was provided under prior law.s" As a result, salary and interest
payments made to a partner are now deductible expenses in deter-
mining the partnership taxable income. The guaranteed payments are
subject only to the requirement that they must be made without
regard to the income of the partnership. In this respect, the partner-
ship agreement should clearly spell out the guaranteed salaries of the
partners independent of the amount of partnership income received."s
The partners should be forewarned of the consequences of a guaran-
teed payment in the case where there is not sufficient ordinary income
to cover the salaries or where there is a considerable amount of special
income received by the partnership. The incidents related to the tax
treatment of guaranteed payments may affect the tax positions of
partners other than the recipient."7 Nevertheless, careful tax plan-
ning can avoid the unintended consequences connected with guaran-
teed payments. 8
total of $11,000 that A reports from partnership sources exceeds the actual gross income of
the partnership. Since A's gross income, as stated in his return, will be $11,000 ($6000 salary
plus $5000 distributive share of partnership gross income), the $2000 understatement of
gross income will not exceed twenty-five percent as required by 5 6501(e). Thus, the
exaggeration of A's gross income, brought about by the interplay of 5 707(c) and 5702 (c),
is actually beneficial to the taxpayer and prejudicial to the Commissioner's case.
"See Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Advisory Group
Recommendations on Subchapters C, 1, K, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959). The proposed
amendment made it clear that the amount included in the partner's gross income computa-
tion under § 702 (c) would be his distributive share of the partnership gross income in excess
of his guaranteed payment included under § 707(c). The House adopted an amendment to
§ 702(c) in H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1960) which varied in wording from the
proposal of the advisory group, but nevertheless, obtained the same consequences. Although
the bill passed the House in 1960, it died when the Senate failed to act on it. See also
Anderson & Coffee, Proposed Revision of Partner and Partnership Taxation: Analysis of the
Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter K, 15 TAX L. Rav. 285, 297-300 (1960) for a
discussion of the proposed change in § 702(c). The article questions the results that would
be obtained through the application of the proposal by the advisory group.
85 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
'a It should be noted that the Tax Court has held that the substance of a transaction
rather than its form must govern in determining whether there is a guaranteed payment
under § 707(c). F. A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011 (1963).
87 See notes 76 and 79 supra and accompanying text.
s In connection with the planning of the partnership agreement, see generally Kahn,
Drafting the Partnership Agreement Under the 1954 Code, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX
909 (1956); Willis, The Model Partnership Agreement, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX





The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 represents a compromise be-
tween the aggregate and entity approaches of partnership taxation.
Under the general rules of those provisions pertaining to the de-
termination of a partner's distributive share, the draftsmen of the
code adopted the entity approach. However, as an alternative to the
general provisions, the partners are allowed to divide specific items of
income and loss under the aggregate approach of partnerships. These
alternative provisions seem to acknowledge that partners may often
need to divide specific items of income or loss in a special manner in
order to reflect accurately the equities and economic realities sur-
rounding such items. However, it should be emphasized again that
to take advantage of the alternative provisions, the partners must
expressly elect to make such allocations in the partnership agreement.
The special allocation privilege of sections 704(b), 704(c), and
707 (c) can perhaps be utilized in every conceivable type of partner-
ship arrangement, both to reap benefits and to avoid hardships. Al-
though the careful draftsman should certainly stay within the tax-
avoidance limitation in a section 704 (b) allocation, he should not
fear that a special allocation will be accorded unfavorable tax conse-
quences merely because it would result in tax savings. As long as the
allocation correctly reflects the surrounding economic and business re-
alities, the tax consequences can and should mirror the express terms
of the allocation agreement. Provided that the tax planner stays with-
in the statutory boundaries, he is limited only by his own ingenuity
and imagination.
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